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The crisis of confidence in the field of psychology has to do mainly with the low reliability of the
process of collecting and assessing the evidence (Pashler and Wagenmakers, 2012). Questionable
practices of researchers, publication bias, and other effects can distort our interpretation of a body
of evidence. Each method and technique of analysis has weaknesses and potential threats. The most
convincing scenario is one in which a variety of methods with different weaknesses converge on the
same conclusion.
Such convergence does not show up for the so-called ego-depletion effect (Baumeister et al.,
1998). Primary studies using different experimental paradigms have provided inconsistent evidence
(e.g., see Kurzban et al., 2013, and the subsequent debate). The first meta-analysis that synthesized
the evidence concluded that the effect exists (Hagger et al., 2010). Subsequent meta-analyses with
different inclusion/exclusion criteria and specific methods to address the effects of publication
bias have concluded that the effect exists, but the estimated effect size (ES) is substantially lower
(Carter andMcCullough, 2014), or even null (Carter et al., 2015). A Registered Replication Reports
(RRR) initiative has questioned the replicability (and the very existence) of the ego-depletion effect
(Hagger and Chatzisarantis, 2016).
Let us review the results of the meta-analyses. Hagger et al. (2010) collected 198 independent
estimates, and their overall ES estimate is d = 0.62 (0.57–0.67; I2 = 34.7). Later, Carter and
McCullough (2014) argued that the evidence in this field of research can be strongly influenced
by small-study effects. Such effects, essentially magnified by the publication bias toward significant
results, may have yielded an overestimate of the ES, which could in fact be zero. Most procedures
for detecting publication bias are based on departures from symmetry in the funnel plot (Light
and Pillemer, 1984). However, although publication bias results in such asymmetries, not all
asymmetries are a by-product of publication bias. Other factors (e.g., p-hacking) can yield
indistinguishable effects.
While the asymmetries only call attention to probable ES over-estimations, there are also some
methods for assessing and correcting the effect of publication bias. Carter and McCullough (2014)
applied several of those methods to the dataset of Hagger et al. (2010), including the trim-and-
fill procedure (Duval and Tweedie, 2000) and two regression methods proposed by Egger et al.
(1997) and refined by Moreno et al. (2009) and Stanley and Doucouliagos (2014). Their corrected
estimates for Hagger et al.’s dataset are d= 0.48 (trim-and-fill) and d=−0.10 or d= 0.25 (with the
two regression procedures). In their response, Hagger and Chatzisarantis (2014) allege that in those
re-analyses, Carter andMcCullough (2014) assume the unsupported belief that the asymmetries are
due to publication bias and not to other factors.
In a new series of meta-analyses, Carter et al. (2015) proposed deep changes in the
inclusion/exclusion criteria and made a more exhaustive search for non-published studies. Their
new dataset had 116 independent estimates, 28 (24.14%) in common with those used by Hagger
et al. Their overall ES estimate was 0.43 (0.34–0.52; I2 = 71.55), ranging from 0.24 to 0.79, when
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the studies were disaggregated according to the experimental
task. The overall estimate is smaller than that of Hagger et al. but
the heterogeneity of the effects (I2) is much larger.
At first glance, the logical conclusions from that meta-analytic
evidence must be that the first meta-analysis overestimated the
ES, that the actual population ES is substantially lower or even
null, and that the estimates obtained are most probably by-
products of publication bias and other circumstantial factors. We
add to this puzzle a re-analysis of the datasets of the two meta-
analyses (Hagger et al., 2010; Carter et al., 2015) using the p-
uniform method. We will show that in the ego-depletion case the
conclusions can be seriously influenced by the method chosen to
synthesize the evidence (see also Cunningham and Baumeister,
2016).
RE-ANALYSIS WITH THE P-UNIFORM
METHOD
A recent alternative strategy to address publication bias focuses
only on the primary studies with significant results. When a body
of research has a noticeable influence of publication bias, the
published significant studies better represent the population of
all potential significant studies than the non-significant published
studies represent the population of non-significant studies.
Therefore, inferences made from the significant studies are more
reliable than those based on all published studies. The only
assumption is that within the statistically significant studies, the
conditional probability of being published is independent of the
p-value. A statistical model of the significant p-values under such
an assumption (p-curve) is used to model the data (Simonsohn
et al., 2014), and an estimate of the parameter is obtained for the
best fit to a uniform distribution of the normalized values (Van
Assen et al., 2015).
Following Simonsohn et al. (2014), Carter and McCullough
(2014, footnote 3) explicitly dismissed the p-uniform procedure
for their meta-analysis arguing that in some primary studies of
ego-depletion the basis for significance is an interaction test,
instead of the simple effect synthesized in the meta-analysis.
Their rationale is that categorization of studies according
to the significance of the interaction does not match the
categorization based on significance of the simple effect. When
both categorizations match, there is no problem. When the
interaction is significant but the simple effect is not, that study
can be excluded from the dataset before the p-uniform analysis.
However, the studies with a non-significant interaction but
with a significant simple effect can end in the “file-drawer.” As
this process would probably eliminate more small- than large-
simple effects, the results with the p-uniform test would bias
the ES estimate upwards. Despite that, and according to the
recommendations of van Aert et al. (2016), we believe that a
p-uniform analysis can be validly applied to these datasets.
We have used two methods to estimate the parameter
(Van Assen et al., 2015). We applied the p-uniform test,
with the method-of-the-moments (Irwin-Hall distribution), and
the minimal Kolmogorov–Smirnov test, excluding from both
datasets every non-significant study as well as those studies in
which the interaction was significant but the simple effect was
not. As well as the respective authors did before, we truncated
the extreme values to a maximum of d = 1.5. The R code and the
databases from bothmeta-analysis are available as supplementary
materials. The method-of-the-moments provides the values d
= 0.64 and d = 0.66 for the Hagger et al. and the Carter
et al. datasets, respectively (Figure 1). The Kolmogorov–Smirnov
method yields very similar values: d = 0.65 and d = 0.66.
Therefore, were the p-uniform the only method used to analyze
both data sets, the naive conclusions would be that: (a) the ego-
depletion effect exists, (b) the ES is of a moderate magnitude,
and (c) the results from both datasets converge. Importantly,
the conclusions are not sensitive to the differences between the
inclusion/exclusion criteria employed in the two meta-analyses
(remember that only 28 of the 116 independent estimates in the
Carter et al. dataset were also included by Hagger et al.).
In what follows we elaborate a different interpretation of the
evidence, taking into account the results from the p-uniform
analyses while trying to find some rationale for the incongruences
between the results obtained with the different methods and
procedures.
In datasets with high publication bias, the p-uniform method
applied to the significant studies should provide a smaller ES
estimate than the traditional method applied to all the published
studies. However, in datasets withmedium to large heterogeneity,
the p-uniform might yield some overestimate due to the small-
studies effect (bias toward large ES studies). Then, if we focus only
in the p-uniform results, our assessment regarding the dataset
of Hagger et al. should be that there is no relevant publication
bias (the estimates with both methods are very close, and the
heterogeneity is low; I2 = 34.7). The re-analysis made by Carter
and McCullough (2014) of Hagger et al.’s dataset, while taking
into account the effects of publication bias, provide lower ES
estimates than those obtained by Hagger et al. However, we know
that the asymmetries they found in the funnel plots can be due
to different factors than publication bias, and that the regression
methods employed are not robust with heterogeneous datasets.
Then, what happens with the dataset of Carter et al.? In
that dataset the p-uniform method applied to the significant
studies yielded an ES estimate considerably higher than the
traditional method with the complete dataset. One possible
explanation is that the strict criteria of inclusion/exclusion
employed had important (unintended) collateral consequences
on the distribution between the counts of studies with significant
and non-significant results. As a result, their database might have
an under-representation of significant studies, and the ES of 0.43
with the traditional method increases to 0.66 when analyzed
with the p-uniform method. Alternatively, the increase in the p-
uniform estimate could be also due to the high heterogenity in
Carter et al.’s dataset.
In Carter et al.’s dataset there is a striking result: the specific
variance (representing the random effects factor) is much higher
(τ2 = 0.16; I2 = 71.6) than in Hagger et al.’s dataset (τ2 = 0.04;
I2 = 34.7). The difference between those values also needs an
explanation. Relevant for that difference are the results of the
RRR. The aim of the RRR initiative was to provide new evidence
for the debate about eliminating the threat of publication bias
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FIGURE 1 | Initial frequency distributions of p-values for the null hypothesis test (A,B) and frequency distributions of the delta values of 0.64 and 0.66 (C,D
respectively).
(Hagger and Chatzisarantis, 2016). The process for RRR requires
the use of a rigorous protocol that has the advantage (and the
disadvantage) that homogenizes the procedures. The conclusion
after summarizing the results of 23 independent replications is
that the ES is not statistically different from zero for the specific
experimental paradigm chosen and the set of conditions in the
protocol. As expected, after all the efforts made to homogenize
the studies, when the dataset was synthetized with a traditional
random effects model, the specific variance was smaller than
in the two meta-analyses (τ2 = 0.02; I2 = 36.08). The specific
variance of Hagger et al. (0.04) and the RRR (0.02) represent
similar percentages because the total variance in both cases are
different, and the heterogeneity of the sample sizes was larger in
Hagger et al. On the other hand, the specific variance in Carter
et al. (0.16) represents a much larger percentage of the total
variance.
We can view the specific variance in the RRR as a kind
of floor value for the heterogeneity in the research with the
experimental paradigm they employed. The results of this RRR
allow us to state with greater confidence that, at least for the
experimental paradigm chosen, the ego-depletion effect is very
small, practically irrelevant. This conclusion can only generalize
to studies done with the specific protocol of the RRR. However,
several subtle sources of variability not controlled in the RRR
protocol are responsible for the τ2 = 0.02 value (I2 = 36.08).
Then, why is the specific variance in Carter et al. four times larger
than in Hagger et al.?
The p-uniform method very efficiently overcomes the
publication bias threat, but it also has some weaknesses. Themost
important appear when the average p-value of the significant
studies is high (0.025–0.050), and when the database shows high
heterogeneity (I2 > 50; van Aert et al., 2016). An anomalously
high proportion of p-values close to the significance threshold is a
strong cue for p-hacking. As the average p-values in the databases
analyzed here are 0.011 for Hagger et al. (median: 0.007) and
0.012 for Carter et al. (median: 0.007) we dismiss such a scenario.
The I2 value of Carter et al.’s dataset is well above 50, but that of
Hagger et al. is below that threshold. Again, we should be more
confident with the p-uniform estimate based on Hagger et al.’s
dataset.
CONCLUSIONS
Our analyses add new arguments to the current debate on the
ego-depletion effect, showing that it might have been premature
to conclude that it is an experimental or statistical artifact. The
ego-depletion effect has been proposed as a much more general
phenomenon than the specific situation of the RRR protocol. It
is expected to appear in many different circumstances. The two
databases re-analyzed here include samples of studies that better
represent the variety of experimental paradigms in the literature
than the studies in the RRR. A good understanding of the effect
with all its subtleties requires both intensive efforts focused on
specific but varied paradigms under RRR initiatives, and fair
procedures to analyze the databases that arise spontaneously
from the laboratories. As long as there is no agreement on what
a fair procedure is, we should report the results found with
several methods that have different strengths and weaknesses.
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The range of results obtained will ultimately give us a more
complete picture.
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